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“A woman’s place is in the home.” Like all axioms, this one masks as much historical reality as it reveals. It certainly encapsulates normative views that have been widely held 
and underscores near ubiquitous identification of women with a 
domestic sphere, but it does little to describe women’s actual and 
changing activities or their impact on society as a whole.1 The 
very positing of a distinctive place for women presupposes another 
one, a place construed, perhaps, as the primary domain of men. 
For feminists concerned about assessing women’s diverse and 
changing roles in, and contributions to, their societies, both the 
problems and the importance of a concept like “separate spheres” 
lie at the heuristic and descriptive levels alike. As explanatory 
or analytical categories, a “private sphere” distinct from, but 
co-relatively linked to, a “public sphere”—as the spheres 
could be named at their most generic level—has come to be 
construed in so many different ways that they increasingly cause 
misunderstanding among scholars. Such conceptual confusion 
is only compounded when “the public” and “the private” come 
to embrace, or to be aligned with, any number of conceptually 
related contrastive binaries, such as the political v. the social, 
the state v. the family, the political community v. the domestic 
household, communal interests v. personal desires, the impersonal 
v. the intimate or familial, the official v. the unofficial, the formal 
v. the informal, the authoritative v. the merely influential, the 
masculine v. the feminine. Yet however clearly defined, the terms 
remain problematic at the descriptive level if they are treated as 
unchanging universals. For each historical situation, considerable 
care must be taken properly to describe not only the activities 
that were assigned to each sphere, but also how contemporaries 
construed the ways in which the spheres related to each other 
and to associated concepts. Only then can significant comparisons 
be made between women’s roles and how they were evaluated at 
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diverse times and places, or, indeed, within different social classes 
at any one time. 
 The purpose of this brief discussion is to suggest that 
the distinction between “public” and “private” spheres remains 
useful in understanding core differences between the political 
powers of modern and medieval women—at least those medieval 
women of noble birth married to men of the ruling aristocratic 
elite3—and, in consequence, in appreciating how politically active 
women would have been evaluated. This is the case for each of 
the two main ways the concept has been deployed; namely, either 
to encapsulate the contrast between sovereign states and society 
or to point to a realm of informed public opinion that is poised 
between government and domestic affairs. And the distinction 
remains useful in comparing “medieval” and “modern” views of 
women’s powers even if, for much of the patrimonial world of 
the Middle Ages, the distinction between the spheres virtually 
disappears, with much of the “public” sphere being subsumed 
into the “private.” The result, at the descriptive level, is that 
many activities of the aristocratic lordly elite that would be 
classed as “public” in a modern context—including those related 
to exercising jurisdiction or ruling over others—were effectively 
“private” or “domestic” matters in the middle ages.4 Hence, to the 
extent that female lords wielded the same powers as aristocratic 
men and performed the same lordly deeds, their authoritative 
powers could be considered equal to those of their male peers.5
 In other words, at non-royal levels of lordship in 
particular, no qualitative difference was drawn between the 
authority with which noble women acted, or the legitimacy of 
their lordly powers, when compared to those of aristocratic men. 
It is thus anachronistic and inappropriate, when discussing the 
“feudal society” of France as twentieth-century French historians 
have construed that world, to view the lordly powers wielded 
by women as somehow of a lower order or of lesser legitimacy 
than those same powers when wielded by men. The domain of 
women of the lordly elite—the spheres in which they exercised 
dominion—included, in certain routinely occurring situations, 
the exercise of authoritative jurisdictional powers over lands and 
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men, and nothing struck contemporaries as extraordinary when 
women wielded those powers in those contexts. Like men’s, the 
measures they took could displease as well as please articulate 
contemporaries, although, because women represented the marked 
gender and there were fewer female lords than male ones, lordly 
women’s actions tended to attract exaggerated praise or blame. 
Still, however much such commendations or condemnations 
might be linked to other traits deemed particularly feminine, 
noblewomen’s capacity to act with lordly authority was not 
denied.6 Since noblewomen came to lose their rights to “own” 
and control property and to exercise jurisdiction over tenants 
and others bound to them by the exchange of lands or rights and 
oaths of fidelity or homage, these comments support the notion 
that “modern” states were established at the expense of (some) 
women’s rights.7 The failure of any woman to be accorded the 
same rights to participate in new political institutions of liberal 
or republican democratic states as fully as many men shows that 
the process of building “modern” states was integrally linked to a 
major reconceptualization both of “public” and “private” spheres 
and of men and women as gendered human beings. 
 The first widely used sense of the distinction between 
public and private spheres evoked above—that contrasting law and 
governance to households and families—has long been entrenched 
in historiographical traditions. It built on both the Aristotelian 
separation of the oikos from the polis and the distinctions in 
Roman law drawn between what pertains to particular individuals 
and to the community as a whole. It was used by generations of 
social theorists and historians to encapsulate the salient differences 
between the impersonal bureaucratic government of modern 
states, with their legally-defined institutions, officially-authorized 
agents, and monopolies on legitimate violence, and patrimonial 
societies that are structured largely by means of kinship ties, 
personal lord-client bonds, seigneurial (lordly) jurisdiction, and 
domestic or household-based economies.8 
 In this view, the “feudal” world is “private” by definition, 
with the rights and powers of medieval lords (domini) derived in 
part from the household roles and moral authority traditionally 
men, and nothing struck contemporaries as extraordinary when 
women wielded those powers in those contexts. Like men’s, the 
measures they took could displease as well as please articulate 
contemporaries, although, because women represented the marked 
gender and there were fewer female lords than male ones, lordly 
women’s actions tended to attract exaggerated praise or blame. 
Still, however much such commendations or condemnations 
might be linked to other traits deemed particularly feminine, 
noblewomen’s capacity to act with lordly authority was not 
denied.6 Since noblewomen came to lose their rights to “own” 
and control property and to exercise jurisdiction over tenants 
and others bound to them by the exchange of lands or rights and 
oaths of fidelity or homage, these comments support the notion 
that “modern” states were established at the expense of (some) 
women’s rights.7 The failure of any woman to be accorded the 
same rights to participate in new political institutions of liberal 
or republican democratic states as fully as many men shows that 
the process of building “modern” states was integrally linked to a 
major reconceptualization both of “public” and “private” spheres 
and of men and women as gendered human beings. 
 The first widely used sense of the distinction between 
public and private spheres evoked above—that contrasting law and 
governance to households and families—has long been entrenched 
in historiographical traditions. It built on both the Aristotelian 
separation of the oikos from the polis and the distinctions in 
Roman law drawn between what pertains to particular individuals 
and to the community as a whole. It was used by generations of 
social theorists and historians to encapsulate the salient differences 
between the impersonal bureaucratic government of modern 
states, with their legally-defined institutions, officially-authorized 
agents, and monopolies on legitimate violence, and patrimonial 
societies that are structured largely by means of kinship ties, 
personal lord-client bonds, seigneurial (lordly) jurisdiction, and 
domestic or household-based economies.8 
 In this view, the “feudal” world is “private” by definition, 
with the rights and powers of medieval lords (domini) derived in 
part from the household roles and moral authority traditionally 
16 16
accorded to those of noble status. To those were added many 
powers of command that “feudal” lords appropriated (not 
always violently), as “private” individuals, from the portfolio of 
“public powers” previously exercised for the common good by 
governments headed by emperors and kings.9 Generations of 
historians construed as “private law” the politically important 
privileges that lords granted individuals and corporate groups, and 
stressed the unofficial or uncertain legal standing of the informal 
written compilations of orally transmitted customs embodying 
the longstanding (though not immutable) traditions of folk 
communities. Then they contrasted such customs to statutory 
laws formally promulgated in writing and enforced by official 
state authorities.10 The vast majority of the documents known 
generically as charters—largely recording property exchanges 
among the aristocratic elite, from modest knights to counts 
and dukes as well as their clerical relations—continued to be 
classed as “private acts” distinct from the “public acts” of the 
royal governments of kings, even if they recorded transactions 
of fundamental economic importance or relating to the feudal 
relations between fief-giving lords and their men.11
 The familial feuds (guerrae) over inheritances and single 
combats or other forms of judicial self-help that played such 
prominent roles in processing disputes were lumped together and 
dismissed as mere “private war.” Like other family possessions, 
honors—those bundles of lands, rights, and titles that constituted 
the material base of the social prestige and political reach of the 
ruling chivalric elite—were acquired largely through inheritance, 
albeit according to distinctive rules, such as those governing the 
transmission of those peculiar goods called fiefs. Indeed, the 
integral link between one’s honor and one’s honors discloses 
the extent to which the public domain of the state had come to 
be subsumed into the domestic realm of dynastic families and 
lordly households.1 With the exception of kings and a few major 
princes, the military, fiscal, and judicial activities of the lordly 
elite were deemed, in this view, to be sub-political: the self-
interested affairs of “private persons” meriting consideration as 
meaningful, historically significant events only to the extent that 
they contributed to the formation of modern states.  
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 At the heart of understanding the implications of 
these views for noblewomen’s powers in France lies a problem 
of translation: what English word best conveys to a modern 
audience—on both sides of the Atlantic—the sense of the word 
domina as understood in the eleventh to thirteenth centuries? 
Domina, the feminine form of dominus, is most frequently 
translated as “lady.” But does “lady” adequately convey the powers 
and jurisdictional authority of the consorts of medieval lords? 
Perhaps in the United Kingdom, where Lady is the title borne 
by female members of a constitutionally empowered House of 
Lords. But what are the authoritative powers of the wives of the 
hereditary peers in that body? Ladies they may be, but in that 
case the title refers to their elevated social status, not to any 
jurisdictional authority as might be exercised by their husbands. 
A lady may be deferred to, but not because of her lordly powers. 
Indeed, in many other English-speaking countries, if “lady” 
connotes anything specific, it is high social standing and perhaps 
adherence to a certain code of behavior.13 Powers of command over 
lands and people, such as wielded by medieval lords (domini), do 
not enter the mental picture at all.
 Yet noblewomen married to men of the ruling aristocratic 
elite, in their roles as heads of households, consorts of lords, 
and mothers of heirs, could find themselves wielding the same 
lordly powers as their husbands and with the same wider-ranging 
political consequences. Whether commanding household cooks, 
household clerics, or household knights, the domina, or lady, of 
the castle, was as much a lord (dominus) as her husband. When 
she controlled lands, honors, and revenues in her own right 
(whether as inheritances or marital assigns or both), or when she 
acted as regent-guardian for an absent husband or minor son, 
her lordly powers and political impact would often expand.14 But 
because those activities, performed by wives as well as widows, 
took place in what was effectively a domestic domain writ large, 
they were viewed as natural extensions, not transgressions, of 
noblewomen’s traditionally feminine and domestic social roles. 
Ample evidence for such attitudes is found, for example, in letters 
disclosing the manifold ways reforming clerics like Ivo of Chartres 
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and Peter Damian treated matter-of-factly with the female lords 
in their midst, or how a town like St Omer had written into its 
charter of liberties the rights of the castellan’s wife to initiate 
certain judicial proceedings in her husband’s stead.15 As Marc 
Bloch eloquently declared, women in “feudal society” were never 
deemed “incapable of exercising authority. No one was disturbed 
by the spectacle of the great lady presiding over the baronial court 
when her husband was away.”16
 Granted, women’s rights to “own” or to hold real 
property—i.e., their legal capacity in modern terms—are distinct 
from their practical ability to dispose of it at will, but both 
theoretical rights and actual control are important in gauging 
women’s activities and how they were judged. A woman disposing 
of property legally hers, or exercising customary jurisdiction 
over her tenants, fief-holding knights and servile peasants alike, 
can hardly be cast as a usurper of someone else’s rights. Women 
in France during these centuries were never legally banned from 
inheriting real property, whether after their parents’ death or 
before, in the form of dowries. Noble daughters might routinely 
be subordinated to their brothers in the inheritance of fiefs, 
becoming their fathers’ principal heirs only when they had no 
living brothers at the time of their fathers’ deaths. Yet they were 
not excluded from inheriting fiefs and their inheritance shares in 
non-feudal properties (i.e., allods) tended to be more equal to 
their brothers’.17 The vast majority of wives had dower properties 
from their husbands’ estates assigned to them when they married 
and increasingly came to be endowed with dowries when they wed. 
Dowries never replaced dowers in eleventh-to-thirteenth century 
France, as they eventually would in some Mediterranean towns.18
 Certainly, customs designed to protect women’s 
rights from domineering men could be flouted, such as those 
prohibiting a husband from alienating his wife’s property without 
her consent, or a son from evicting his mother from her dower 
estates. But such customs could not routinely be ignored, as is 
disclosed in the records of judicial actions taken by French women 
to reclaim their lands, which still await systematic study.19 At the 
same time, however, the charters documenting wives alienating 
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their own properties without reference to either their husbands 
or their inheriting sons discloses that any custom granting men 
sole control over women’s lands—and there is no formal trace 
of one in French customary law of the eleventh to thirteenth 
centuries—could likewise be flouted; analogues of coverture as 
found in English Common Law developed unevenly and late 
in French customary codes.0 Numerous, though not all, wives 
who alienated property were acting in their husbands’ absence: 
the communications technology of the day, the mobility of the 
chivalric elite, and the size of many noble patrimonies regularly 
placed wives in the position of having to take decisions in their 
husbands’ stead. In addition, widowed guardians for minor heirs 
were commonplace in most of the medieval French realm, where 
any rights of lords—kings included—to control wards and their 
fiefs never could be systematically enforced.1 At this time, when 
first wives tended to be younger than their spouses, and the fathers 
of their children suffered from the relatively high mortality rates 
of men devoted to military pursuits, widow-guardians featured 
routinely in the generational cycle of lordly families. Widows 
could command the people and revenues of all of their husbands’ 
inherited estates, in addition to their dowers and dowries, and any 
joint property acquired by the couple. Medieval dominae, without 
deviating from their traditional domestic roles in aristocratic 
households, had ample opportunity to wield lordly powers. 
 Furthermore, when comparing or contrasting the powers 
of medieval lords and ladies it is too often forgotten that dominus 
was not a legally-defined title conferred by official authority; 
rather, it was a term of respectful address reflecting the deference 
accorded to those powerful seniores (elders, seigneurs, lords) of 
noble or common birth, who had come to constitute a ruling 
elite.3 Freely bestowed upon them by their contemporaries, 
dominus is thus an honorific title, even as it encapsulates the 
powers over land and people—traditional and newly-acquired 
alike—those men wielded. The repeated exercise of any new 
powers, combined with the traditional rights of nobles, worked 
to convert any de facto powers seized by such domini and their 
knightly followers into socially-sanctioned, legitimate, customary 
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authority that was eventually systematized as customs came to be 
compiled in written form from the end of the twelfth century.4
 But if dominus was essentially an honorific title, why 
is domina so often dismissed as a “mere” honorific, with ladies 
conceived largely as more or less efficient household managers or 
“mere” ceremonial adjuncts of their powerful husbands? When 
a knight or castle lord sought the authorization of his domina 
to alienate fiefs he held from her, or sought judicial redress at 
his domina’s court for properties he claimed were unjustly taken 
from him, the domina he was adressing was his personal or 
feudal lord in precisely the same sense that a dominus would have 
been.5 And when the domina consented to his grant or presided 
over the juridical proceedings whereby his goods were restored, 
or when she ordered him to join the offensive campaigns of her 
lord or directed him in the defense of her castle-residence, she 
was exercising commonplace lordly prerogatives that could have 
significant effects in the wider political community. For domini 
and dominae alike, such prerogatives were rooted in a “domestic 
domain” comprised of noble families and their inherited honors, 
along with their households (familiae), clienteles of sworn men 
(fideles), and other dependent tenants.
 By the same token, it is too easy to forget that all titles, 
even those like viscount or count, were not routinely conferred 
on individuals by delegation from a higher authority (e.g., the 
king) in these centuries, when no kingdom-wide hierarchy of 
titles was defined in law.6 Like dominus, they, too, could be as 
much traditional honorifics as badges of office. For example, count 
(comes) could be used interchangeably with duke (dux) in many 
contexts, even in relation to the dukes of Normandy. The title 
comes could be borne as a status indicator by groups of brothers, 
as was the case with the “counts of the Bretons,” even if only one 
would inherit the bulk of the family’s patrimony.7 And, to note 
one example among many, Rotrou, lord of Nogent and Mortagne, 
sought the authorization of no higher authority—not the king of 
France, not either of his immediate lords, the count of Blois or 
the duke of Normandy—when he began to call himself “count of 
Perche” in the later eleventh century.8 How then does the title 
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of countess differ from that of count? Both were honorifics and 
both denoted the lordly powers wielded by the title-bearer. And 
when countesses renounced privileges like the jus spolii (the right 
to control episcopal goods during vacancies), collected dues like 
the droit de gîte (hospitality), established markets, served monks 
as their advocate, swore to enforce the Lord’s peace, ordered 
their knights to fight, received homages from their sworn men, 
or declared fiefs forfeit, they did so with the same authority as 
counts, even if countesses took such actions less often than did 
counts in France during the eleventh to thirteenth centuries.
 Some of those and related lordly powers appear, in 
“common sense” terms, to be quite “public.” They concerned 
the disposition of landed estates, the allocation of economic 
resources, and feudal relations (in the strict sense of involving 
fiefs and the relations among fief-holders and their fief-giving 
lords). Authoritative measures taken by lordly women were often 
enacted openly before, or in conjunction with, leading laymen 
and clerics drawn from circles extending well beyond kin or 
residential groups. Without doubt, the lordly deeds of women 
could affect powerful men and have significant political effects in 
wider regional—or even regnal—communities. Indeed, some of 
the most important recent work in medieval women’s history is 
the steady stream of studies that examine French noblewomen’s 
surprisingly well-documented contributions to this extra-familial 
world of lords’ courts, where disputes were settled, property 
transactions authorized, political favors dispensed, and oaths 
binding lords and followers exchanged.9
 Drawing attention to the domestic grounding of the 
powers of female lords is not meant to deny in any way the 
important public consequences of lordly women’s deeds, when 
‘public’ is understood in such a generic, common sense way.30 
Rather, it is to make two further observations. The first is to 
remind an academic readership that, however “public” the effects 
of noblewomen’s lordly deeds, dominae performed them within 
their socially-ascribed roles in aristocratic households and with 
the same domestically-rooted, highly-personalized “traditional” 
authority as was perceived to legitimate the lordly deeds of 
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elite men. In other words, because of the central place of the 
aristocratic household in the structures of political power at this 
time, the powers of all medieval lords had a “private” domestic core 
as well as a “public” political-jurisdictional face. Any historian who 
posits a fundamental distinction between how power and authority 
were exercised in a fundamentally “private”—patrimonial medieval 
world from how they are construed in impersonal, “public”—
bureaucratic states will have to define very carefully what he or 
she means by the “public powers” of any medieval lord—male or 
female.31 But since both male and female lords in the middle ages 
derived their authority from, and exercised their jurisdictional 
powers within, a common “domestic domain,” to argue that the 
socially-sanctioned powers of lords and ladies were qualitatively 
different in kind risks a fall into self-contradiction, even if male 
lords routinely exercised a wider range of such powers—most 
notably, in military pursuits—than did their female peers. 
 Furthermore, evocation of lords’ courts leads directly 
to the second technical sense in which a distinction between 
“public” and “private” spheres has been deployed. As articulated 
most prominently by Jürgen Habermas, the distinction refers to 
the historically-situated emergence of a realm of informed public 
opinion by non-noble, bourgeois members of society who could, 
as groups of “private” individuals, come together to influence the 
official actions of governing authorities in European monarchical 
states.3 Although medievalists could argue that many pre-
existing conditions for the emergence of such a literate public 
sphere date from the mid-thirteenth century (if not before), 
their combination and particular force as motors of the social and 
political changes leading to the development of “democratic” states 
undeniably date to the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.33 
Habermas’ historically-sensitive understanding—extended by 
some feminist historians to embrace the women absent from his 
account while deemed inadequate to that task by others34—does 
not negate the first sense of distinct “public” and “private” spheres, 
as discussed above, so much as it succeeds that conception in time, 
as the sphere of governmental authority in Europe became more 
depersonalized and bureaucratically complex.35 Examination of 
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the “pre-modern” side of Habermas’ views discloses—as in the 
previously-discussed distinction—a homology between the ruling 
powers of women and men of the medieval aristocracy, with the 
implication that contemporaries did not conceive of the powers 
of non-royal lordly women as being any less authoritative or less 
legitimate than the powers of non-royal lordly men. 
 The “Habermasian” sphere of public opinion resulting 
from the growth of social institutions for the open exchange of 
ideas among freely gathered groups of private individuals—what 
might be called civil society distinct from the apparatus of 
state—could not, by definition, exist in any meaningful way in the 
central Middle Ages (even as aspects of it did). And, as Habermas 
suggests, it might not continue to exist in the (post)modern 
west. Yet even as he cautions against a looming “refeudalization” 
of liberal democratic societies in the wake of the emergence of 
unfettered “private” media monopolies, Habermas reveals the 
continued conceptual importance of a contrast between “public” 
organs of government designed to ensure the common good and 
“private” parties (individuals and corporate groups), wielding 
powers over others for their own advantage.36
 In Habermas’ usage the sphere of public opinion is poised 
between the official apparatus of government and the domestic—
or, family—life of free citizens, which is regulated by private law 
enforced in state courts. In historical terms, when considering 
how “governance” was organized, the operative contrast is between 
the impersonal institutions of modern states and the personal rule 
through royal or princely courts of earlier eras. In the medieval 
world, according to Habermas, the legitimate authority to rule 
others was displayed at court by those individuals—kings at first, 
followed by princes and leading lords—who were perceived, 
literally, to embody and re-present on earth the external and 
legitimating authority of the sacred realm.37 In France, as kings’ 
powers faltered and local princes appropriated governing functions 
in their regions, leading churchmen increasingly deployed notions 
of Christian rulership traditionally used to authorize royal powers 
to legitimate the ruling powers of the foremost lords and princes 
of the realm. Enjoined to enforce justice and keep the peace in 
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their domains, local lords played essential governing roles at their 
level in the hierarchy of earthly authority established by God. 
Since their jurisdictional authority was held to flow from the same 
divine source as made kings, medieval lords imitated and adapted 
ceremonial practices used at royal courts to display their majestic, 
ruling dignity.38
 Within this schema, female lords unquestionably played 
important roles in the ceremonial representation of authoritative 
powers at lords’ courts, such as have been eloquently evoked 
for twelfth-century France by Frederic Cheyette in his study of 
Ermengard, vicountess of Narbonne.39 But women could also 
embody and re-present that very divinely-ordained authority 
itself—i.e., display “representative publicness” in Habermas’ 
terms—when they wielded lordly powers in the absence of 
requisite men. A telling example of a female lord represented as 
embodying such ruling authority is the extensive, though often 
anachronistically interpreted, verse-epistle extolling the virtue 
of clemency that the poet-prelate Hildebert of Lavardin, when 
bishop of Le Mans, directed in the opening decade of the twelfth 
century to Adela, then ruling as countess of Blois, Chartres, and 
Meaux.
 Hildebert opened by describing the widowed countess 
not only as a woman who ruled a county, but also as ruler 
who administered so capably on her own that she stood as an 
exemplar of all that he deemed necessary for governing a realm.40 
Attributing such praiseworthy qualities to God’s grace rather than 
to her nature, Hildebert proceeded to use the countess’ female 
gender to construct a series of anaphoric antitheses contrasting 
the personal virtue of chastity to the socio-political virtue 
of clemency, while accenting Adela’s position as a ruler who 
embodied both:
You lay aside what is female when you cultivate 
chastity in beauty; you restrain the countess when 
you retain clemency in power. Chastity reconciles 
one man to you; clemency, the people. Through 
chastity you acquire a good name; through 
clemency, favor and support.41
To Hildebert there was no doubt that clemency is the greater 
good because it benefits more people; in his words, “modesty 
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allows comely ones to look after themselves; mercy in ruling 
preserves the safety of the realm.”4 
 Clemency, however, is a virtue only of the powerful, who 
legitimately come to rule over others by the socially-acknowledged 
means of either inheritance, or selection, or the just use of force 
to assert rightful but contested claims. As Hildebert expounded 
upon his theme, clemency becomes a specifically human virtue 
because it depends on the exercise of reason and binds society 
together; it thus distinguishes persons from beasts and links 
rulers in the exercise of their judicial prerogatives to the wisdom 
and mercy of God. It is the most humane and glorious attribute 
of princes, as he demonstrated with a catena of quotations from 
classical authors. Acts of clemency, not cruelty, allow powerful 
princes to prosper. 
 In this erudite verse-epistle directed to Adela’s court, 
the bishop of Le Mans presented a countess to his informed 
readership as the perfect embodiment of a divinely appointed ruler 
exercising power over self and others, in order to emphasize the 
benefits to social order of rational and clement rule by lords of any 
rank or gender. He may well have sketched an idealized portrait 
of Adela’s lordly self-control (she is known to have inflicted harsh 
punishments and resorted to violence when angered),43 but he 
was writing to a prince whose powers he freely acknowledged and 
whose behavior he—as a guardian of Christian morality and self-
appointed advisor—hoped to moderate. Yet his comments have 
all too frequently been taken to imply that Hildebert regarded 
a ruling woman as somehow unnatural, since he asserted that 
the countess owed her lordly powers to divine grace rather than 
to her feminine nature. But do his comments really mean that, 
whereas it took divine intervention to make women rulers, men, 
in contrast, were natural rulers, as several modern commentators 
have claimed?44
 The antithesis of nature and grace was a commonplace 
to medieval theologians, and recourse to it almost a reflex to 
explain a variety of apparent paradoxes. Axiomatic was the 
acknowledgment that all human nature was vitiated by sin so that 
only an act of grace could save individual men and women. The 
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redeemed of both sexes, once sinful humans by nature, could 
be considered “gods by grace” as distinct from the one “God by 
nature.”45 By the same token, the sin-free but human savior, 
“divine by nature,” could only be “human by grace,” as one of 
Hildebert’s neighbors expressed the miracle of the incarnation. 
But in medieval theological reflection, the nature/grace antithesis 
had one particular application: to explain the powers and special 
sacrosanctity of anointed rulers. Kings had by grace what Christ 
(the king) had by nature, and were thus empowered to act as 
God’s agents on earth.46 Not all men were kings and it took an act 
of grace to make a king.  
 Adela, of course, was not an anointed lord, but neither 
was her husband, who, like many other French princes, claimed to 
exercise comital authority “by the grace of God.”47 Significantly, 
Hildebert evoked the antithesis of nature and grace in the context 
of Adela’s ruling powers: it was her lordly, comital powers that 
were conferred by divine grace. Authoritative ruling powers were 
not hers—or any person’s, man or woman—by nature. That God 
also bestowed on Adela the power (virtus) that allowed her to 
remain chaste was perhaps an added bonus in Hildebert’s mind, 
but her chastity was a personal—if peculiarly feminine—virtue, 
distinct from, and of less importance than, her power to punish 
others (potestas puniendi), which this prelate clearly hoped the 
countess would not exercise unreasonably. 
 The antithesis of nature v. grace explained all princes’ 
powers, including Adela’s. Hildebert then artfully harnessed the 
antithesis of the feminine as personal and carnal v. the masculine 
as public and rational to suggest that princely clemency was a 
greater virtue for all legitimate rulers than was personal chastity.48 
Ruling a county, in his commonplace clerical view, depended as 
much on mental as on bodily endowments, and the human ability 
to reason allowed good princes both to control their emotions 
and to rule others as the merciful God would have them do. If the 
female Adela, represented as embodying all worldly goodness in 
moral and political terms alike, could control both self and others 
through reason, how much more powerful would be her example 
to her male peers? 
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 Hildebert’s letter shows that he took for granted the 
gender asymmetry of his era—women were not men’s equals 
in his eyes—even as he freely acknowledged the lordly capacity 
and abilities of one noted, but far from unique, female ruler 
of his day.49 God most frequently granted the capacity to rule 
others to male lords, although in certain regularly and naturally 
arising situations, he also granted it to princes who happened 
to be female. Even women could come to embody the sacred 
authority divinely conferred on rulers and to represent God’s 
will in the temporal realm. Although, in Habermas’ view, such 
“representative publicness” inhering in individual “feudal” lords 
did not constitute a fully public sphere of governance that could 
be distinguished from lords’ personal status, attributes, and landed 
possessions, the ideological grounding of all lordly authority in 
the mind of a divine Lord who vowed to make the last first made 
ruling women a readily explicable phenomenon.50
 To conclude: feminists interested in assessing the powers 
of aristocratic women in eleventh- to thirteenth-century France 
and evaluating them as they would have been viewed by their 
male peers would do well to realize that the two most widespread 
ways in which historians have deployed a distinction between 
“public” and “private” spheres do not apply directly to the central 
Middle Ages. Yet understanding why they do not discloses certain 
key differences between the medieval and modern worlds. One 
distinguishing feature is the fundamental homology in the Middle 
Ages between the lordly powers of noblewomen and elite men 
that would disappear in the erection of modern, democratic states. 
Those lordly powers were wielded largely in a familial or domestic 
context by men and women alike, even as their exercise could have 
important consequences in wider political communities. At the 
same time they were ideologically grounded in a divine will that 
was believed to have established hierarchies of authority in which 
noblewomen ranked above most non-noble men. Male lords 
outnumbered female lords and usually exercised the prerogatives 
of lordly rule for longer periods of their lives. Nonetheless, 
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the ‘natural’ life cycle of aristocratic families or in their absent 
husbands’ or sons’ stead, did so legitimately as active agents, 
not as placeholding ciphers passively transmitting lands and 
rights between men. Whether authoritatively ruling or “merely” 
participating alongside their husbands in court rituals designed 
to display lordly authority, noblewomen came to embody and 
re-present the sacred source of the powers they could both share 
with men and exercise legitimately independently of them. 
 Their customary rights to inherit and control real 
property, to exercise jurisdiction over feudal and servile 
tenants, and to serve as guardians and regents for minor heirs 
drew significant numbers of medieval French women directly 
and legitimately into the realms of politics and governance 
as construed in their day. Such “lordly powers” of French 
noblewomen are substantively different both from the “social 
powers” of the wives of England’s modern-day hereditary peers, 
and from the “official” voting rights and eligibility to hold 
elective offices that were long denied all women in modern 
democratic states. Medieval noblewomen and modern bourgeois 
women exercised important powers from within their domestic 
domains. The significant difference is that in medieval centuries 
the “domestic sphere” included many undertakings that today 
would be placed in the domain of governance and authoritative 
rule over lands and persons. In modern times such activities came 
to be defined in laws that formally denied all women direct and 
legitimate access to a separate, legally-enshrined, “public sphere” 
of official state government. 
National University of Ireland, Galway
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